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The combination of the migration crisis, the poor
economic climate and the continued threat from terrorism
has been blamed for increased hostility towards migration
and migrants throughout Europe. Since the beginning of
the crisis, with hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers
and migrants attempting to enter the European Union
(EU) by land and sea, an increase in intolerance,
xenophobia and hate crime has been reported, even in
countries that have traditionally been tolerant towards
migration such as Sweden. The EU’s Fundamental Rights
Agency (FRA) has reported an increase in discrimination
and hate crime towards migrants and their descendants,
particularly those of Muslim origin.1 However, the growth
of intolerance has also directly impacted settled
communities and traditional minorities including Jews
and Roma.
Some research suggests that opposition to immigration
has remained relatively stable throughout Europe,2 despite
the increasing prominence of the issue in political debate.
However, opinion polls have shown that public attitudes
are increasingly polarized along ideological lines.3 States
such as Germany and Sweden, which have traditionally
adopted generous protection regimes, have witnessed an
increasing public backlash against migration as a result of
the scale of the current crisis. Against this background, far-
right populist parties, which have been marginalized in
Europe since the Second World War, are gaining
increasing inﬂuence within domestic politics. Even in
states such as Hungary, where levels of immigration have
traditionally been low, the migration crisis has been
successfully instrumentalized by politicians to win
support. 
Research has shown that political narratives and media
representations directly shape the public’s perception of
the threat posed by migration.4 The UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed particular
concern at ‘lurid public narratives which appear
deliberately aimed at stirring up public fear and panic, by
depicting these vulnerable people as criminal invading
hordes’.5 Notably, migrants are often viewed as a terrorist
threat, a burden on the state and a threat to societal
cohesion and the culture of the majority. According to a
study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2016, a
median of 59 per cent of respondents across ten EU
member states expressed concern that the migration crisis
would lead to an increased likelihood of terrorism. The
highest percentages – over 70 per cent – expressing such
concerns were in Hungary and Poland.6 The perception
that migrants do not integrate suﬃciently, by learning to
speak the language and adopting local customs and
cultures, is also a key driver of anti-migrant attitudes.
Rather than opposing anti-migrant rhetoric, mainstream
political parties throughout Europe have sought to
appease public sentiment and have adopted increasingly
oppressive policies in response to the challenges posed by
the migration crisis. In some instances, politicians have
directly linked the migration crisis to the threat of
terrorism. However, by focusing on deterrence and the
containment of migrants rather than protection and
inclusion, policy responses to the migration crisis have the
potential to increase public perceptions of insecurity and
fail to challenge the root causes of intolerance. 
The migration crisis has brought to the fore the
challenges faced by European states confronted with mass
inﬂuxes of vulnerable individuals who diﬀer from the
majority population in terms of ethnicity, religion and/or
language. This brieﬁng argues that the approach adopted
by the majority of European states in response to these
challenges not only violates the human rights of migrants,
but that it inhibits successful integration and undermines
societal cohesion more broadly. 
International human rights bodies have called upon
European states to adopt a human rights-led approach to
the migration crisis.7 As noted by François Crépeau, the
UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants:
‘large-scale suﬀering is experienced at each stage of
migration’.8 The measures adopted by European states in
order to deter migration exacerbates the vulnerability of
those ﬂeeing conﬂict, persecution and acute poverty,
rejects their presence in society and creates further patterns
of insecurity. Yet, it is important to also recognize the
relevance of ethnic, linguistic and religious identity to the
development of eﬀective migration policies, particularly in
relation to mass expulsions, immigration detention and
integration. Notably, within Europe, both the EU and the
Council of Europe (CoE) have recognized the need to
adopt integration policies that develop cohesive societies.9
However, in practice, migrant integration policies do not
address identity as a cause of vulnerability, despite the
identiﬁcation of discrimination, prejudice and xenophobia
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as a barrier to integration. The increase in intolerance and
hate crime associated with the migration crisis also
impacts settled migrants and traditional minorities, and
endangers societal cohesion. 
The ﬁrst section of this brieﬁng sets out the impact of
current policy responses to the migration crisis on migrants
themselves and on public opinion, speciﬁcally focusing on
the implications for integration and societal cohesion. The
second section introduces the case for a minority rights-
based approach to migrant inclusion, drawing on the
expertise of minority rights bodies in order to demonstrate
that current policies are likely to be counterproductive and
undermine societal cohesion in the long term. Finally, the
third section sets out what a minority rights-based approach
to inclusion would look like in practical terms, identifying
key policy recommendations.
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The terms migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are
frequently adopted in the context of the migration crisis
without a great deal of speciﬁcity. This publication adopts
‘migrants’ as an umbrella term that encompasses
refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and
undocumented migrants. The term ‘refugees’ is used to
refer to individuals ﬂeeing persecution in accordance with
the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.10 For the purpose of this
brieﬁng, the term ‘refugees’ also encompasses those
persons who do not meet the Convention criteria but are
still in need of protection, for instance those ﬂeeing war or
other mass violence who qualify for protection under the
EU Temporary Humanitarian Protection Directive or the EU
Qualiﬁcation Directive.11 The term ‘asylum-seekers’ is used
to denote individuals seeking protection under either the
UN or EU regimes. The term ‘migrants’ is also used to
denote migrants, such as economic migrants, who are not
able or do not seek to beneﬁt from international
protection.
Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers: terminology
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State policies towards migrants and refugees, at all stages of
the migration process, pose signiﬁcant barriers to their
immediate well-being and, in the longer term, their
successful inclusion in European societies. UN human
rights monitoring bodies have singled out push-backs and
violence at borders, as well as mass expulsions to Turkey, as
policies that violate the human rights of migrants. States
have also sought to deter migrants through inhospitable
reception facilities and long term or indeﬁnite detention.
The failure to adequately resettle migrants from
overstretched border countries such as Greece and Italy has
left migrants vulnerable to smugglers even within Europe’s
borders. Once settled within a country, migrants are faced
with a lack of social care including health care provision,
reduced employment opportunities, compulsory
conﬁscation of valuables, limited welfare support, poverty,
poor education (including language) provision and violent
attacks. As noted by the Overseas Development Institute
(ODI) and Chatham House, ‘Government policy sets the
context in which public attitudes towards migration are
formed, whether in terms of immigration, asylum and
integration policies, or broader economic and social
policies’.12 Thus, the current approach of European
governments to the challenges posed by the migration crisis
has the potential to exacerbate and harden the perception
that migrants pose a threat to the economy, security and
national identity.
Many migrants and especially refugees are vulnerable
due to the ‘extreme psychological and physical trauma’
experienced as a result of persecution, conﬂict or poverty.
However, the migration process, not least ill-treatment in
the hands of smugglers, perilous crossings of the
Mediterranean and the hostile actions of authorities in
transit or receiving states all compound this vulnerability.
From the perspective of migrants with a minority identity,
expulsion to a third country without an individualized
assessment of risk has the potential to expose them to
signiﬁcant harm. The UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights has speciﬁcally expressed concern, in the
context of mass expulsions to Turkey, about whether
Turkey is ‘in legal and practical terms, a “safe third
country” for many people whose return is envisaged’.13 For
example, the lack of individualized assessment of
undocumented migrants means that Syrian-Kurdish
asylum-seekers can be expelled from Greece to Turkey
without any consideration of the ill-treatment of the
Kurdish minority in Turkey. Immigration detention and
reception facilities pose similar concerns, when individuals
belonging to a persecuted minority in their home country
are housed with individuals belonging to the wider group
associated with their persecution. For example, members
of the Yezidi minority are reportedly housed with Muslim
asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Greece.14 These
individuals may not have participated in the persecution
of the minority. However, when combined with the
violence often prevalent in reception facilities, this
insensitivity to the minority identity of asylum-seekers has
the potential to exacerbate insecurity. 
In 2016, the European Commission Against Racism
and Intolerance noted that there had been a shift in
emphasis ‘from receiving and accommodating refugees to
planning and facilitating the integration of migrants’.15 Yet
states such as Croatia, Hungary, Italy and Greece have not
adopted long-term integration policies as they intend to
remain countries of transit.16 Yet, in practice, state policies
continue to undermine rather than facilitate integration.
The use of prolonged asylum detention during status
determination, for instance, means that migrants are
excluded from the rest of society. The CoE High
Commissioner for Human Rights has speciﬁcally noted
that containment policies within European states
‘characterized by prolonged uncertainty about one’s fate
and lack of contacts with the outside world, adversely
aﬀect migrants’ physical and mental health’.17 The lack of
available basic services including health care provision is
particularly problematic as issues including malnutrition
and extreme psychological and physical trauma not only
remain unaddressed, but are also exacerbated by
detention. Long-term health issues in turn prevent
integration, as they undermine the ability of migrants to
enter the workforce, learn the host state’s language and
enter education or further training. The lack of language
provision within reception centres poses an additional
practical barrier to integration, as noted by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD): ‘Asylum seekers frequently have
to wait months, if not years, before they receive language
training and other integration support. And when they are
eventually granted humanitarian status, their ability to
Migration policies and their impact
integrate may have suﬀered long-term damage’.18 These
combined issues associated with reception facilities lead to
a sense of abandonment and breed disillusionment and
anger amongst migrants, which in turn pose barriers to
successful inclusion. 
Outside reception facilities, state policies tend to focus
on functional integration, such as access to the labour
market and language proﬁciency, whilst ignoring other
barriers to inclusion such as isolation, separation from
family and longing for ‘home’. State policies that restrict
or delay family reuniﬁcation, and exclusionary residence
and citizenship policies, have been identiﬁed as factors
undermining eﬀective inclusion. However, states such as
Sweden that have traditionally adopted generous
migration policies have now responded to the migration
crisis by scaling back protections: for example, by oﬀering
temporary residency rather than permanent residency and
reducing the availability of family reuniﬁcation.19
Resettlement policies tend to focus on the dispersal of
migrants, in order to avoid ‘segregation’, spread the
burden, take advantage of aﬀordable housing and facilitate
access to the labour market. Yet, such policies overlook the
importance of community ties for the safety and reduced
isolation of migrants, particularly in the current climate of
intolerance. The dispersal of migrants without attention to
their cultural backgrounds may also reduce access to
cultural resources and undermine integration eﬀorts, as
research has demonstrated that community ties provide an
entry point for migrants into the host society.20
Functional integration is undoubtedly central to
migrant inclusion, as language, entry into the labour
market and education facilitate interaction with the
majority. UNHCR and OECD have stressed that ‘[t]he
earlier migrants enter the labour market, the better their
integration prospects in the long run’.21 Yet, the EU has
expressed concern ‘that third-country nationals continue
to face barriers in the education system, on the labour
market, and in accessing decent housing. They are more at
risk of poverty or social exclusion compared to host-
country nationals, even when they are in employment’.22
Migrants often face restricted access to employment
opportunities, as a result of oﬃcial policy or
discrimination. Furthermore, they are frequently placed in
low-cost accommodation in areas of high unemployment.
Inadequate language provision and failure to recognize
qualiﬁcations pose further barriers to migrants entering
the regular workforce. As noted by the CoE, ‘language
training is rarely ﬂexible or professional enough to
guarantee that most migrants attain the level and type of
language ﬂuency required for their work or their full
participation in public life’.23 Inadequate provision is likely
to particularly impact female migrants who have caring
responsibilities or low-levels of education. Furthermore,
whilst a number of states set language requirements as a
prerequisite for residence and citizenship, they do not all
oﬀer guaranteed free language education. Notably, in
response to the migration crisis, Sweden has reduced
welfare provision and measures to encourage integration,
which had previously included ‘a two-year integration
program that oﬀers language classes, help ﬁnding a job,
and a monthly stipend’24 – the rolling back of this policy is
likely to undermine the inclusion of refugees.
Lack of language proﬁciency reduces the opportunities
for migrants to interact with mainstream society but also
has the potential to drive migrants into the irregular
workforce, and so increase the risk of exploitation and ill-
treatment. Limited interaction with the majority
population in everyday life, alongside a lack of civic or
social integration course, in almost half of CoE member
states, means that in some instances migrants have a
limited knowledge of the society they are living in.25
Whilst these courses have the potential to facilitate societal
cohesion if implemented sensitively, in many cases
colonialist and assimilationist agendas have the potential
to undermine integration and reinforce division.26
Cutting across all of these issues that inhibit the
successful inclusion of migrants is the polarization of
European societies and the associated growth of
intolerance. The UN Special Rapporteur on migrants has
speciﬁcally expressed concern that:
‘ Against the backdrop of a poor economic climate, the
rise in nationalist populist parties and the tragic
terrorist attacks around the world, xenophobia and
hate speech have increased, causing a signiﬁcant
upward trend in negative perceptions of migrants and
creating a stumbling block in the development of
more eﬃcient evidence- and human rights-based
policies.’ 27
Politicians throughout Europe have successfully
instrumentalized the migration crisis in order to increase
electoral support, including the Prime Minister of
Hungary, Viktor Orbán. States that have typically adopted
liberal migration policies, such as Germany and Sweden,
have been overwhelmed by the number of arrivals and,
despite an initially positive response, have witnessed a
growth in opposition to migration and a commensurate
growth of the far right. Resentment of migration has been
linked to the ethnic origin and religion of migrants, with
Roma and Muslims perceived to be particularly
undesirable.28 The European Network Against Racism
(ENAR) has notably reported that ‘[s]ome political groups
have launched adverts either at home or abroad (Denmark,
Hungary, Sweden) to make it as obvious as possible that
certain migrants are not welcome’.29 Central and Eastern
5MAINSTREAMING A MINORITY RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO REFUGEE AND MIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE
6 MAINSTREAMING A MINORITY RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO REFUGEE AND MIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE
which is exacerbated by the migration policies of
European states, means that such hostility places an even
greater barrier to their successful inclusion. This also
impacts settled migrants and minorities. The AC-FCNM
has speciﬁcally highlighted the impact of the growth in
intolerance on the protection of the rights of Jews and
Roma.37 Deepening public hostility towards the Roma
community has been reported throughout Europe.
Notably, in Germany, for example, the media often
associate Roma with criminality and poverty.38
The AC-FCNM has also identified a connection
between Islamophobia and negative attitudes towards
migrants.39 Research carried out by the Pew Research
Center has shown that migrants are often conflated with
Muslims and, specifically, ‘people who have a more
negative view of Muslims are also much more concerned
about the threat of refugees to their country’.40 Far right
movements such as Pegida (‘Patriotic Europeans against
the Islamization of the West’) have held anti-Islam
demonstrations throughout Germany, creating ‘a
climate in which Muslims and persons with a migration
or minority background feel unsafe’.41 The FRA 2017
Minorities and Discrimination Survey reported that one
in four Muslim respondents reported experiencing
harassment on a common basis, with almost half of this
group having faced six or more incidents of harassment
in the previous year.42 Visible markers of difference,
including clothing, skin colour and appearance, were
identified as important sources of harassment and
discrimination. Notably, Muslim women who wear the
headscarf or niqab are more likely to face harassment
than Muslim men and Muslim women who do not wear
such visible markers. The impact of this on integration
is clear:
‘ Experiencing discrimination aﬀects Muslims’ social
inclusion: those who felt discriminated against and/or
experienced harassment or violence show lower levels
of trust in the country’s legal system and the police.
They also expressed lower levels of attachment to their
country of residence.’ 43
European responses to the ongoing migration crisis
consistently fail to recognize that ethnic, religious and
linguistic identity may be the cause of insecurity for
migrants. The growth in intolerance within European
societies undermines successful inclusion, alongside state
policies, from mass expulsions to integration policies, that
fail to recognize the impact of this insecurity on the
successful inclusion of migrants in European societies. If
migrant integration policies are to be successful, there is a
need to mainstream minority rights into migrant policies.
European states, including the Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia, have opposed the resettlement of non-Christian
migrants.30 While opposition to migration is linked to
concerns such as the economy, security and national
identity, public attitudes to migration are also frequently
linked to the identity of migrants.
Rather than challenging rising intolerance and
xenophobia, mainstream political parties have adopted
increasingly hostile migration policies, whilst failing to
challenge the myths and misconceptions that pervade
discourse surrounding migration. Yet, research has shown
that public support for migration is directly linked to
migration policies: ‘more inclusive policies tend to
improve attitudes towards immigrants among the general
public across European countries, while exclusionary
policies tend to harden anti-immigrant sentiments in the
population’.31 In particular, the establishment of
unrealistic targets for migration ‘increase public unease by
cementing a belief that migration is “out of control”’.32
Consequently, the current policy response of European
governments to the migration crisis is likely to harden
public attitudes against immigration and legitimize
intolerance.
Opposition to migration is also underpinned by the
perception that migrants are not integrating into
European societies and do not share European values.
Whilst European regional bodies have placed a greater
emphasis on integration strategies in response to the crisis,
in practice these policies often conﬂate integration with
assimilation.33 The Pew Research Center has revealed that
the majority of Europeans do not see the value of
increased societal diversity,34 a perspective that is often
accompanied by the perception of migrants as a threat to
the culture of the majority. Thus, migrants are expected to
functionally integrate by learning the language of the state
and contributing to the local economy, but the visible
presence of diversity is not welcomed. Such expectations
are unrealistic and counterproductive: ‘[t]hose who feel
threatened or excluded from the host society instead of
striving to belong, may seek to emphasize their diﬀerence
through isolating themselves in their own communities
and may also be more open to radical inﬂuences’.35
Increased discrimination, hate speech and hate crime
not only have a detrimental eﬀect on the inclusion of
recent migrants, they also impact pre-existing migrant
communities and citizens of European states who diﬀer
from the majority. As noted by the Advisory Committee
to the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities (AC-FCNM): ‘Minorities cannot
thrive in a society in which diversity is not tolerated or
even serves as a pretext for hate crimes and
discrimination.’36 In Europe, the vulnerability of migrants,
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Minorities of concern to MRG are disadvantaged ethnic,
national, religious, linguistic or cultural groups who are
fewer in number than the rest of the population and who
may wish to maintain and develop their identity.
Yet, within Europe, the term ‘minorities’ is often used to
denote groups with a longstanding or permanent presence
in the state. States have frequently objected to the
inclusion of recent groups, including migrants, within the
scope of application of minority rights instruments such as
the CoE’s FCNM. Often differential treatment on this basis
is justiﬁed by the perceived temporary nature of migration
and the expectation of eventual return to the country of
origin. However, in practice, ‘the myth of return’ often
undermines the successful inclusion of migrants, who will
eventually settle in the host state. Notably, there has been
a marked shift towards the recognition of the relevance of
minority rights for settled migrant communities by states
and international mechanisms, including the UN Human
Rights Committee and the CoE’s AC-FCNM.44
The migration crisis has highlighted the overlapping
and intersecting issues faced by migrants and minorities.
Migrants, much like minorities, are often treated as a
homogenous group. However, migrants frequently face
obstacles to inclusion on the basis of a number of
intersecting identities, including race, religion and gender.
In the current context, there is signiﬁcant opposition to
Muslim and Roma migration throughout Europe.
Further, some groups, such as Yezidis and Kurds, have
been subject to persecution on the basis of their minority
identity in their homeland both historically and during
current conﬂicts. If migrants are treated as a homogenous
group the speciﬁc needs of minorities subject to historical
persecution are not recognized and, in some instances,
may result in further ill-treatment in the country of refuge. 
In contrast, other migrants are members of the
majority in their country of origin but now find themselves
in a minoritized situation as a result of fleeing conflict or
poverty. Adaptation to this situation will not be immediate
and will require support if integration strategies are to be
successful. Distinctions made between migrants, settled
migrant communities and minorities are likely to be made
on the basis of arbitrary criteria and overlook the needs
of the individuals concerned. Recent migrants may join
pre-existing settled migrant communities that are already
recognized as minorities in the host state. Rather than
being a source of arbitrary distinction, such overlaps can
be used to aid the inclusion of recent migrants. 
Finally, the impact of the migration crisis and,
specifically, the associated increase in xenophobia,
intolerance and hate crime, has had broader implications
for the protection of the rights of minorities within
European states. The current climate has a direct impact
on settled migrants and minorities as well as more recent
migrants. The AC-FCNM has not only noted that there
has been an increase in intolerance towards national
minorities, including Roma and Jews, but also that this
may impact the ability of these communities to exercise
their rights, as they ‘are occasionally forced to hide their
identities to avoid harassment, threats and violence’.45
Thus, the current climate impacts all groups that differ
from the majority in terms of ethnic, religious or linguistic
identity. It is not possible to protect the rights of traditional
minorities, without also seeking to tackle the increase in
hostility towards ‘the other’ that also impacts migrants.
The nexus between migrants and minorities
The rise in ‘hate speech and racist, xenophobic and
extremist discourse’ throughout Europe, coupled with ‘a
deepening polarization along ethnic and linguistic, and at
times religious lines’,46 demonstrates that the cultural
identity of migrants is an important factor in European
responses to the migration crisis. Opposition to
immigration is often underpinned by concerns about
security, the economy and cultural identity, which mirror
historical concerns about traditional minorities. Notably,
the AC-FCNM has emphasized the relevance of the
Framework Convention in the context of the challenges
posed by the migration crisis, economic dislocation and
security concerns.47
Thus, a minority rights-based approach to migrant
inclusion uses the knowledge gathered under the banner
of ‘minority rights’ in order to identify a more positive
approach. Minority rights standards were speciﬁcally
developed to ‘create stable and sustainable societies where
diﬀerence is expressed and aﬃrmed’.48 Rather than
restricting the rights of migrants in response to societal
polarization and divisive politics, a minority rights-based
approach aims to facilitate the creation of inclusive
societies that are open to diversity. Integration strategies
must seek to develop societies in which migrants feel
welcome and are able to participate in all areas of life.
Although functional integration strategies go some way
towards achieving this by allowing participation in the
labour market, other factors such as intolerance and
hostility towards diversity create a sense of insecurity and
undermine the ability of migrants to thrive. Well-
integrated migrants are more likely to make a positive
economic and social contribution to their host society. 
Whilst the ethnic, religious and linguistic identities of
migrants is central to their well-being, state policies tend
to treat migrants as a monolith and fail to appreciate the
relevance of migrant identity to policies adopted in
response to mass migration. Cultural identity is not
factored into mass expulsion policies, placement in
detention or reception facilities, or resettlement policies.
Furthermore, the importance of cultural ties to human
dignity, well-being and overcoming isolation are not
recognized in integration policies. It is increasingly
accepted that if the inclusion of migrants is to be
successful, then integration policies must move past
functional integration and seek to foster a sense of
belonging. For example, the EU has recently suggested
‘that integration should go beyond participation in the
labour market and mastering the language of the host
country: integration is most eﬀective when it is anchored
in what it means to live in diverse European societies’.49
However, in practice, migrant integration strategies at a
national and supranational level continue to focus on
labour market access and language proﬁciency. A minority
rights-based approach to inclusion builds upon pre-
existing functional integration approaches but adds to
these strategies to deal with the speciﬁc challenges posed
by diversity. It acknowledges that migrants are not only
vulnerable as a result of their immigration status but also
as a result of their ethnic, linguistic and religious
diﬀerences. 
A minority rights-based approach recognizes the
relevance of migrant identity to successful inclusion.
Rather than requiring the assimilation of migrants into the
culture of the host state, it emphasizes that:
‘ The integration of refugees is a dynamic and
multifaceted two-way process which requires eﬀorts by
all parties concerned, including a preparedness on the
part of refugees to adapt to the host society without
having to forego their own cultural identity, and a
corresponding readiness on the part of host
communities and public institutions to welcome
refugees and meet the needs of a diverse population.’ 50
Current migrant integration strategies tend to pay lip
service to the concept of the mutual adaptation of all
members of society, whilst in practice identifying
strategies only pertaining to the integration of migrants
into broader society.51 Hostility to diversity and the
expectation of assimilation places the burden of adaptation
on migrants and refugees to the detriment of their well-
being. As is widely recognized within minority rights,
forced or unwanted assimilation is a human rights
violation and is likely to be counter-productive.52
Mutual adaptation is a prerequisite for successful
integration. However, the recognition of the importance
of the ethnic, linguistic and religious identities of migrants
and a demand for mutual adaptation is insuﬃcient to
ensure that host populations will view diversity positively.
A particular challenge in this respect is that majority
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The alternative - a minority rights-
based approach to migrant inclusion
populations often view the cultural backgrounds of
migrants as a threat to national identity and societal
cohesion. Thus, key drivers of intolerance and xenophobia
must be challenged if societal cohesion is to become a
reality. While concerns about the economic burden on the
state underpin opposition to migration, discrimination
and hate crime pose barriers to migrant education and
employment and, thus, prevent migrants from becoming
contributing members of society. 
Research has suggested that politicians and the media
inﬂuence the formation of negative perceptions of
migrants.53 In the context of the migration crisis,
dehumanizing and stereotyped media portrayals present
migrants as a threat. A minority rights-based approach
emphasizes the importance of accurate and impartial
reporting on immigration. However, it is unlikely that this
will be suﬃcient to overcome public concerns about the
threat posed by migration. Contact and interactions
between migrants and the majority are central to creating
mutual trust and understanding between the majority and
migrant communities. A meta-analysis of more than 500
studies has demonstrated a correlation between intergroup
contact and prejudice reduction.54 While it is diﬃcult to
demonstrate causality, opinion polls have demonstrated
that those who live in diverse areas in the United
Kingdom are more likely to hold favourable views about
diversity than those who live in homogenous areas.55
While state integration policies have frequently sought to
reduce ethnic segregation in neighbourhoods, research
suggests that workplace diversity plays a more important
role in ensuring integration. In particular, those who work
in diverse workplaces are more likely to form friendships
with immigrants than those who work in homogenous
workplaces.56
Thus, a minority rights-based approach to migrant
inclusion aims to build welcoming and cohesive societies
that recognize the salience of ethnic, linguistic and
religious identity to the experience of migrants. This
requires that barriers to participation in society are
overcome, including discrimination and hate crime
alongside the removal of practical obstacles to
employment and further education.
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A minority rights-based approach to the inclusion of
migrants builds upon (rather than replaces) pre-existing
strategies relating to functional integration. By responding
to the societal challenges posed by diversity, this approach
to integration facilitates the creation of an environment in
which it is possible for migrants to develop into
participating members of European societies, by fostering
a sense of belonging. A minority rights-based approach is
underpinned by four interconnected issues: the
recognition and preservation of migrant identity; non-
discrimination and equality; intercultural dialogue and
tolerance; and the participation of migrants in society.
However, awareness of migrant identity must also be
mainstreamed into functional integration policies. The
latter three areas have increasingly been recognized,
although under-elaborated, in migrant and refugee
integration strategies, such as the CoE’s Issue Paper, ‘Time
For Europe to Get Migrant Integration Right’, and the
EU’s ‘Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country
Nationals’. However, the importance of cultural, linguistic
and religious identity to successful integration strategies is
consistently overlooked. Without this ﬁnal element,
migrant integration is likely to be (and frequently is)
conﬂated with migrant assimilation. This leads to
insecurity, increased vulnerability and undermines a sense
of belonging to the host society. Thus, this section
develops inclusionary migrant integration strategies, using
two documents that have sought to establish the broader
relevance of minority rights standards in contemporary
Europe: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE)’s ‘The Ljubljana Guidelines on
Integration of Diverse Societies’ and the CoE’s AC-
FCNM, ‘Fourth Thematic Commentary on the Scope of
Application “The Framework Convention: a key tool to
managing diversity through minority rights”’. 
Recognition and preservation 
of migrant identity
In practice, the cultural, linguistic and religious identities
of migrants is perceived to be a threat to national identity
and societal cohesion, leading to hostility and intolerance.
However, cultural identity is central to human dignity and
the rejection of the cultural identity of migrants is likely to
lead to withdrawal from society rather than inclusion. Yet,
cultural identity may also be a source of insecurity and
persecution for migrants, leading them to ‘keep within
their comfort zones in terms of culture, religion and
language’ in order to feel safe.57 State policies, at all stages
of the migration process, must be sensitive to the cultural
identity of migrants. Whereas alienation and exclusion
fuel radicalization and result in polarized societies,58 the
recognition of the cultural identity of migrants facilitates a
sense of being welcome and of belonging.59
Key strategies in order to facilitate the recognition and
preservation of migrant identity include the following:
• EU states should refrain from expelling migrants to
third countries, without carrying out an individualized
assessment of whether migrants are at risk, particularly
(but not exclusively) on the basis of their ethnic,
religious or linguistic identities.
• States should ensure that migrants ﬂeeing persecution
are not placed with members of the group associated
with their persecution in detention or reception
facilities. 
• Resettlement or dispersal policies should bear in mind
that migrants may choose to live in close proximity to
others of a similar ethnic, religious or linguistic
background on the basis of safety, access to cultural
resources and access to support networks. 
• Actors at all levels must respect and support the
preservation of the cultural, linguistic and religious
heritage of migrants, whilst simultaneously
recognizing that culture is not static. 
• Actors at all levels must avoid negative rhetoric and
stereotyping in relation to migrant cultural practices. 
• Migrant communities must be consulted in relation to
all policies and legislation that have the potential to
impact the preservation of their identity.
• Migrants must be permitted to manifest and practice
their religion without interference from state and non-
state actors, including the general public.
• The use of migrant languages must not be prohibited,
especially in the private sphere.
• Actors should adopt measures to support the
preservation of migrant languages, for example, by
providing space for language classes for children,
supporting the development of online learning tools
and/or supporting the development of minority media.
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How can a minority rights-based
approach be achieved in practice?
• Actors at the level of national, regional and local
government, alongside civil society actors, should
support the development of media to facilitate the
promotion of migrant language and culture.
• Actors at the level of national, regional and local
government, alongside civil society actors, should
provide support for cultural activities and events, in
particular those activities that provide opportunities
for intercultural dialogue. 
• The recognition and preservation of migrant identity
should be mainstreamed into other integration
strategies, not least those relating to functional
integration. 
Non-discrimination and equality
The recognition and preservation of migrant identity is,
however, insuﬃcient to facilitate the integration of
European societies as this focuses on diﬀerence rather than
commonality. Measures are also required to enable
migrants to become members of the host society.
Discrimination and a lack of equality in relation to
employment, education and access to social care prevents
migrants from achieving functional integration.60 In turn,
this may result in an unwillingness to invest in education
and training.61 It is signiﬁcant that migrants are likely to
face intersectional discrimination, on the basis of both
their immigration status and their ethnic, religious or
linguistic identity/ies (as well as of course other grounds,
such as gender, if relevant). Discrimination and inequality
not only prevent migrants from accessing key services,
they also pose barriers to their participation in society. Key
strategies in this respect include:
• A comprehensive anti-discrimination and equality
legislative framework must be adopted and respected
by the authorities. Such frameworks must recognize
the particular challenges posed by intersectional
discrimination.
• Legislation must be enforced in practice by the courts
and reinforced by an independent institutional
structure, with a mandate to develop, implement and
monitor anti-discrimination policies.
• Migrants must be made aware of the legal framework,
how to exercise their rights and civil society
organisations that are able to provide support.
• Formal equality may not be suﬃcient and states may
need to adopt special measures in order to facilitate de
facto equality. This may include the removal of legal,
economic and social obstacles to full equality such as
the recognition of migrant qualiﬁcations and prior
work experience and the provision of education,
training opportunities and appropriate healthcare. 
Intercultural dialogue and 
tolerance
Intercultural dialogue and tolerance are central to a
minority rights-based approach to migrant inclusion. This
is based on the understanding that lack of knowledge of
‘the other’ underpins hostility towards diversity and
contributes to an environment of fear. As discussed earlier,
European societies have become increasingly hostile to
migration, viewing diversity negatively and associating
migration with terrorism. The perpetuation of myths
about migration by the media and policy-makers has
legitimized intolerance and increased hostility to diversity
in Europe. Yet, as noted by UNHCR, ‘[e]ﬀective
integration requires a society that is both diverse and
open, where people can form a community and sense of
safety, regardless of diﬀerences’.62 Further, OECD’s
Indicators of Immigrant Integration show that:
‘ Social cohesion can ... be measured by analyzing the
host country’s degree of acceptance of immigration. A
high level of acceptance will indirectly promote the
conditions for successful integration – if the
immigrant population is welcomed, it will be better
able to contribute to the life of the community.’ 63
Intercultural dialogue uses education alongside
interactions between migrants and the majority to
facilitate tolerance, openness and positivity towards
diversity. While it has become increasingly central to
integration policies in Europe, much less emphasis has
been placed on intercultural dialogue by integration
policies adopted in the context of the migration crisis,
despite the reported growth of intolerance and
xenophobia. Notably, migrant integration strategies, such
as the CoE’s ‘Time for Europe to Get Migrant
Integration Right’ and the EU’s ‘Action Plan on the
Integration of Third Country Nationals’ focus on
developing migrants’ knowledge of the receiving society
rather than the majorities’ understanding of migrants and
migration. Lack of understanding of migrants and their
situation will inhibit successful interactions and has the
potential to reinforce myths about the other. However, at
least some politicians and sections of the media continue
to perpetuate myths and misconceptions about migrants
and minorities that have the potential to undermine
societal integration. 
Strategies to improve intercultural dialogue and
tolerance include the following:
• Migrants must be given the opportunity to learn
about the society that they are joining, preferably prior
to arrival. Societal integration education should be
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provided alongside language education, but must not
be conﬂated with cultural assimilation.
• Society must be educated about the causes of
migration, the value of migration and diversity to
society, and the culture of migrants. This can be
through formal education (such as mainstreaming into
the general curriculum or citizenship classes), public
information campaigns or through the media. 
• Intercultural education (in the context of both
majority and migrant education) must avoid
stereotyping migrant cultures as incompatible with
European values. 
• Teacher training must be provided in relation to both
teaching about diversity and the challenges and
beneﬁts associated with diverse classrooms. 
• There must be opportunities for intercultural
interactions. These include:
– the workplace or educational institutions,
– social community activities,
– youth and sports events,
– volunteering opportunities.
• Support should be provided for civil society
organizations that aim to create spaces and
opportunities for intercultural interactions.
• Eﬀective hate speech and hate crime legislation must
be introduced and enforced. Particular attention
should be paid to the challenges posed by social
media. 
• Migrants must be informed of ways to report hate
speech and hate crimes, and these complaints
mechanisms should be easily accessible to migrant
communities. Prompt follow-up and action, including
investigation and prosecution of alleged perpetrators,
is important in order for such mechanisms to be
credible in the eyes of migrant communities. 
• Politicians must not reinforce negative stereotypes
regarding migration, migrants or migrant groups.
Furthermore, politicians must condemn hate speech
and hate crime in all its forms.
• The media must refrain from perpetuating myths
about migration and migrants. While the right to
freedom of expression must be respected, legislation
prohibiting hate speech must be enforced against the
media. The media should develop eﬀective self-
regulatory mechanisms.
• There must be space for a counter-narrative within the
media that provides objective information about
migration.
• Migrants should be represented in the media and
migrants must be consulted in order to avoid
stereotyping and misrecognition.
Participation in society
Finally, the ability to participate in all areas of society is
central to a minority rights-based approach to migration, as
recognized in the EU ‘Action Plan on the Integration of
Third Country Nationals’ and the CoE’s Issues Paper.
However, participation in society is only possible if society
embraces rather than rejects migrant identity,
discrimination is tackled and barriers between migrants and
the majority are broken down. Participation in education
and the labour market allows migrants to become self-
reliant, develop a sense of self-worth and continue their life
with dignity. Further, functional integration, through the
workplace and education, provides opportunities for
interaction between migrants and the rest of society. By
reducing poverty, employment facilitates the participation
of migrants in social and community life, creating further
opportunities for intercultural dialogue. Similarly, the
ability to engage with political structures facilitates a sense
of belonging and ownership, and allows migrants to
participate in decisions that directly impact them. Key
strategies in this respect include the following:
• Migrants must have adequate opportunity to learn the
language of the majority but this must not be to the
detriment of their own language. Language classes
must be tailored to educational level and suﬃciently
ﬂexible to accommodate work and family
commitments, with a speciﬁc emphasis on the
inclusion of migrant women.
• Migrant qualiﬁcations and prior work experience must
be recognized, in order to aid the transition into the
workplace.
• Adequate opportunities for education and training
must be provided.
• Poverty and ill-health signiﬁcantly impact the ability
of migrants to participate in society. States must adopt
measures to enable migrants to overcome these
hurdles, such as providing access to adequate housing,
healthcare, social protection (social insurance and
social beneﬁts) and social welfare services.
• A comprehensive anti-discrimination and equality
legislative framework must be adopted and respected
by the authorities. Speciﬁc measures should be
adopted in order to prevent discrimination against
migrants in employment and education.
• Citizenship, permanent residence and family
reuniﬁcation facilitate a sense of belonging and
contribute to the well-being of migrants. Pathways to
citizenship, permanent residence and family
reuniﬁcation should not be unduly burdensome.
Cultural assimilation must not be a prerequisite of
citizenship or family reuniﬁcation. Furthermore, states
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that establish language and cultural awareness as a
prerequisite for citizenship, permanent residence or
family reuniﬁcation must guarantee free-of-charge
access to appropriate education. 
• States should allow participation in political decision-
making processes at all levels of government. This
might be through electoral arrangements, specialized
governmental bodies, consultative mechanisms,
participatory decision-making procedures and
awareness-raising campaigns. Migrant participation in
decision-making processes that directly impact them
must be prioritized.
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The EU’s ‘Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country
Nationals’, adopted in 2016, builds upon the EU’s
‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration
Policy’ (adopted in 2004, reafﬁrmed in 2014). These
principles establish, in addition to measures to facilitate
functional integration, that states should view integration
as a two-way process (Principle 10). Principle 8
recognizes the value of diversity and the importance of
safeguarding cultural and religious practices, providing
that they do not violate ‘other inviolable European rights or
with national law’. The Principles identify intercultural
education for both migrants (Principle 3) and majorities
(Principle 6) as a priority, alongside the ability to
participate in the democratic process (Principle 9).
Consequently, the EU Common Basic Principles for
Immigrant Integration Policy appear to provide a solid
basis from which to develop a minority rights-based
approach to the inclusion of migrants, although key
concepts such as majority education about migration and
migrants and the safeguarding of migrant cultures are
underdeveloped. 
Yet, in translating these principles into the EU’s Plan,
these key issues remain under-elaborated. This can be
attributed to an understanding of the ‘two-way’ process of
integration that, in fact, places the burden of adaptation
on migrants: ‘This dynamic two-way process on
integration means not only expecting third-country
nationals to embrace EU fundamental values and learn the
host language but also offering them meaningful
opportunities to participate in the economy and society of
the Member State where they settle’.66 This suggests that
the majority, whilst providing opportunities for migrants to
participate in society, is not required to take active steps
to adapt to the presence of an increasingly diverse
society. The emphasis on the integration of migrants ‘into
the host society’, further supports this view. The key
policy priorities elaborated in the Action Plan focus on
functional integration, in relation to employment,
education, access to accommodation and basic services,
alongside the education of migrants about their host-
society, rather than the corresponding adaptation of the
majority. Without efforts to facilitate the adaptation of the
majority, prejudice and intolerance are likely to increase.
Importantly, the Action Plan highlights that ‘[i]n times
when discrimination, prejudice, racism and xenophobia are
rising, there are legal, moral and economic imperatives to
upholding the EU’s fundamental rights, values and freedoms
and continuing to work for a more cohesive society
overall’.67 Despite recognizing that intolerance has the
potential to undermine societal cohesion and integration, the
Action Plan places very little emphasis on this in terms of
practical steps. For example, in relation to ‘pre-arrival
measures’, the Action Plan identiﬁes the importance of
preparing ‘receiving communities for the arrival of third
country nationals, contributing to building empathy and
understanding to overcome prejudices and fostering an
open and welcoming attitude’. Yet this is not reﬂected in the
steps to be undertaken by the EU Commission or member
states in furtherance of the Action Plan.
The ﬁnal point, ‘active participation and social
inclusion’, only brieﬂy identiﬁes the role of the majority in
successful intercultural interactions: ‘It can have beneﬁts
both on newly arrived third country nationals (by making
them feeling part of their new community and helping the
understanding of key values and norms), and on the host
society, increasing acceptance and helping building a
welcoming attitude’. In setting out concrete steps to
facilitate this, the Action Plan encourages member states
to ‘[i]nvest in projects and measures aimed at combating
prejudice and stereotypes (e.g. awareness-raising
campaigns, education programmes)’ and to ‘[f]ully
implement legislation on combating racism and
xenophobia’. The implementation of legislation to combat
hate speech is a prerequisite of any integration policy, but
practical steps are also required to ensure that the root
causes of intolerance are addressed and that the
intolerance of the majority does not inhibit migrants from
manifesting their identity in public spaces. The education of
the majority is key in this respect, but so too are steps to
facilitate the preservation of migrant identity, in order to
ensure that they feel a sense of belonging. Yet, the majority
of discussion under this point in the Action Plan, focuses
on the participation and integration of migrants. It is vital
that integration policies emphasize that integration requires
all members of society to adapt and that the burden of
integration does not lie exclusively with migrants.
Case study: The EU Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals
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Mainstreaming a minority rights-based approach to refugee and migrant communities in Europe
The combination of the migration crisis, the poor
economic climate and the continued threat from terrorism
has been blamed for increased hostility towards migration
and migrants throughout Europe. Since the beginning of
the crisis, with hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers
and migrants attempting to enter the European Union (EU)
by land and sea, an increase in intolerance, xenophobia
and hate crime has been reported, even in countries that
have traditionally been tolerant towards migration.
Discrimination and hate crime towards migrants and their
descendants, particularly those of Muslim origin, is now on
the rise – and this growing intolerance is also directly
affecting settled communities and traditional minorities
such as Jews and Roma.
Against this background, far-right populist parties are
gaining increasing influence within domestic politics, even
in states where levels of immigration have traditionally
been low. Negative political narratives and media
representations directly shape the public’s perception of
the threat posed by migration, and have driven the
resurgence of a strongly anti-migrant politics across
Europe even among centrist parties. However, by
focusing on deterrence and the containment of migrants
rather than protection and inclusion, policy responses to
the migration crisis have the potential to increase public
perceptions of insecurity and fail to challenge the root
causes of intolerance.
The migration crisis has brought to the fore the challenges
faced by European states confronted with mass influxes of
vulnerable individuals who differ from the majority
population in terms of ethnicity, religion or language. This
briefing argues that the approach adopted by the majority
of European states in response to these challenges not
only violates the human rights of migrants, but that it
inhibits successful integration and undermines societal
cohesion more broadly. While the need to adopt
integration policies that develop cohesive societies is
widely acknowledged, in practice, migrant integration
policies do not address identity as a cause of vulnerability,
despite the identification of discrimination, prejudice and
xenophobia as a barrier to integration. This publication
therefore makes the case for a minority rights-based
approach to migrant inclusion to support the development
of diverse, unified and open societies across Europe.
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